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RESUMEN 
 
El gobierno colombiano, liderado por el presidente Juan Manuel Santos, ha sostenido un 
proceso de paz con las FARC desde el 2012. Aparentemente, Colombia se dirige hacia la paz, 
y por ello, es más relevante que nunca analizar por qué los procesos de paz previos han 
fracasado. Este artículo utilizará el concepto del BATNA (Mejor Alternativa a un Acuerdo 
Negociado) como un marco teórico para analizar la configuración de poder en el proceso de 
paz que se llevó a cabo del 1998 al 2002 entre las FARC y el gobierno colombiano, liderado 
por Andrés Pastrana. En este sentido, el objetivo es analizar cómo el principio del BATNA, 
propuesto por Roger Fisher y William Ury, puede explicar los motivos por los cuales el 
proceso de paz fracasó. El artículo está dividido en cuatro secciones, la primera examina 
literatura sobre los éxitos y fracasos de procesos de paz. La segunda sección explica 
brevemente el contexto histórico del conflicto. La tercera describe los procesos de paz 
previos a 1998, y la cuarta detalla los eventos más importantes que ocurrieron en Colombia 
entre 1998 y 2002 durante el proceso de paz, aplicando el marco teórico del BATNA y 
explorando los motivos que explican el fracaso del proceso de paz. Finalmente, la conclusión 
sugiere que el principio del BATNA es una variable válida que debería ser usada para 
explicar otros procesos de paz, sin embargo, sugiero que existen otras variables contextuales 
igualmente relevantes que deben ser consideradas en cada proceso de paz. 
Palabras clave: BATNA, FARC, Andrés Pastrana, Colombia, Negociación, Proceso de Paz 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Colombian government, led by President Juan Manuel Santos, has been engaged in a peace 
process with FARC since 2012. With the country now on an apparent path to peace, it is more 
relevant than ever to analyze why the previous peace processes failed and understand what 
mistakes were made. This article examines the peace talks between FARC and the Colombian 
government, led by President Andrés Pastrana, that took place between 1998 and 2002 using the 
concept of Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) as a theoretical framework to 
examine the power configuration at the negotiating table. The objective will be to analyze 
whether the concept of BATNA, proposed by Roger Fisher and William Ury, can explain why 
this peace process failed. For this purpose, the article will be divided in four sections, the first 
one examines literature about the success and failure of peace process. The second section 
describes the background of the conflict. The third section briefly explains the previous peace 
processes in Colombia, and the fourth section details the most important events that took place in 
Colombia between 1998 and 2002 applying the framework of  BATNA’s and focusing on the 
reasons why the peace process failed. Finally, the conclusion suggests that the BATNA can be 
used as a valid variable that researchers in the international field should use to explain the failure 
of more negotiation processes, however, there are other variables of context that should be 
considered in each case.  
Key words: BATNA, FARC, Andrés Pastrana, Colombia, Negotiation, Peace Process, Fisher 
and Ury  
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars in the field of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution have been largely focused 
on finding a theory that explains why some peace processes fail while others move forward or 
succeed. Researchers1 have also looked for explanations for the failure of peace processes 
between the Colombian government and FARC focusing on a wide array of elements such as 
negotiation strategies, credibility, international commitment, and others. However, none of them 
has focused on the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), a concept proposed 
by Fisher and Ury, defined as the course of action taken by a party if no agreement is reached. A 
BATNA is not only an alternative to agreement, but it is also an indicator of the power balance 
in a negotiation. This means that the better the BATNA of one actor, the stronger their position 
relative to the others. Hence, a negotiated solution will be harder to reach if one or more of the 
parties has a stronger BATNA.  
The concept of BATNA “became a gold standard for negotiation researchers”, and is now 
taught in negotiation and diplomacy classes around the world (Thompson and Leonardelli 2004, 
115). In theory, the concept of BATNA was proposed as a negotiation strategy. In other words, it 
was thought to be a course of action that negotiators should undertake when trying to solve a 
conflict or agree on any issue. Over time, the concept of BATNA became more relevant and now 
it is not only used by practitioners, but also, studied by scholars when analyzing a bargaining 
position. Nevertheless, it has not yet been used as a theoretical framework to explain the failure 
of a negotiation. Keeping that in mind, this article will test the validity of Fisher and Ury’s 
proposal with a relevant case. I have chosen the peace process between FARC and the 
                                                          
1 See texts by Antonio Bejarano, Marc Chernick, Jonathan Hartlyn, Camilo Leguizamo, Alfredo Rangel, Matthew 
Shugart  
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Colombian government led by Andrés Pastrana, because of the variety of social, political, 
economic and military elements that played out before and during this negotiation process. 
Furthermore, explaining the failure of previous peace processes is key, especially in a moment 
where another peace process is taking place in Colombia.  
For this purpose, the article will be divided into four sections. Section I examines the 
literature concerning the success and failure of peace processes. This section also describes what 
BATNA means and discuss its theoretical implications. Section II presents a historical review of 
the conflict between the Colombian military and FARC until 1998. Accordingly, this section will 
explain the origins and growth of FARC as a belligerent group, and its relationship with the 
Colombian party system.  Section III consists of a brief review of the previous attempts of peace, 
especially the ones led by the administrations of Belisario Betancur and César Gaviria. Section 
IV will describe the most important events, obstacles and achievements of the peace process led 
by president Andrés Pastrana and analyze them using BATNA’s. This means identifying the 
BATNA of the Colombian government and FARC respectively, evaluating the power dynamics 
of the bargaining table throughout the peace process. The objective of this section is to compare 
the BATNA’s of both actors, and determine whether this concept can be a valid explanation for 
why the peace process failed.  
SECTION I 
State of the Art 
Peace and Conflict Resolution Studies originated in the United States in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. As a response to the American involvement in the Vietnam War, many 
universities developed nonviolence studies programs to explore the origins of conflict and 
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theorize about negotiation techniques (Katz 1989, 15). Ever since, numerous theories have 
emerged regarding why peace processes fail or succeed. There are three main theoretical 
approaches that explain the reasons why peace processes fail or move forward: the rational 
choice approach, the conflict resolution techniques approach and finally a set of theories that 
combine both. 
 First, the “rational choice” approach argues that negotiation depends on the costs and 
benefits it may cause for the parties. In this sense, authors like Zartman, Shugart, Berdal, Mason 
and Fett, Collier, and others affirm that variables such as economic status, durability of the 
conflict, hurting stalemate and institutional reforms define whether the parties are ready to 
achieve a successful negotiation (Villacreces 2003, 7).  
On the other hand, the “conflict resolution techniques” set of theories explains that the 
outcome of a peace process will be determined by the way the negotiation is managed. For 
example, authors like Rothchild and Walter assert that third party involvement and mediation are 
key to determine whether a negotiation takes a coercive or noncoercive path. This approach 
highlights the active role that third parties can have to create successful commitments between 
parties (Walter 2002 on Villacreces 2003, 7).  
The third and last approach is not a unified set of theories, but comprises several 
approaches that analyze how internal and external constraints affect a negotiation process. As 
stated by Mac Ginty, “the success or failure of any emerging peace process depends on the 
interaction between a range of variable influences” (Darby and Mac Ginty 2000 on Villacreces 
2003, 10). In this sense, authors like Mac Ginty, Hoglund, Pillar, and Darby affirm that 
institutions, external actors and economic conditions define the outcome of a negotiation.  
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These authors’ contributions are relevant, yet, none of them offers a precise explanation 
of why the peace process failed. In other words, they focus in too many variables instead of a 
concrete one. Accordingly, I propose using the concept of BATNA proposed by Roger Fisher 
and William Ury. BATNA stands for Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement and it was first 
introduced by Roger Fisher and Willian Ury in the book Getting to Yes, oriented towards 
providing practitioners with the key steps for achieving a successful negotiation. Fisher and Ury 
picture the concept of BATNA as a useful one when the other side is more powerful. This 
means, the other party is either stronger, richer, or better connected. In this scenario, the authors 
affirm that it is necessary to come up with a tentative answer to the question of what to do if no 
agreement is reached, by analyzing the realistic options they have. As the authors affirm: “The 
better your BATNA, the greater your power. People think of negotiation power as being 
determined by resources like wealth, political connections, physical strength, friends, and 
military might. In fact, the relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarily upon how 
attractive to each is the option of not reaching an agreement” (Fisher and Ury 1983, 106).  
 As stated by Fisher “That was a word we just made up. It was a new concept. Nobody 
had ever talked about it before” (Fisher and Ury 2004, 107). Getting to Yes is now considered 
one of the most relevant books in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, and it has been labeled 
“a big bang” of negotiation theory because of the “sheer enormity of the book and the 
universality of the concepts” (Thompson and Leonardelli 2004, 113). Additionally, it has been 
included in academic texts about diplomacy2 and it has been used in game theories as a value 
that expresses the potential power of each party3.   
                                                          
2 See International Negotiation in a Complex World –Jonathan Wilkenfield, Bridget Starkey and Mark Boyer 
3 See Power Dynamics in Negotiation – Peter H. Him, Robin L. Pinkley and Alison R. Fragale   
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As stated earlier, the objective of this article is to use the concept of BATNA as a 
qualitative variable to explain why the 1998 peace process between the Colombian government 
and FARC failed. Thus, it is crucial to understand that the better the BATNA of one party 
relative to the other, the more imbalanced the power configuration will be during a negotiation, 
and the harder it will be to create an agreement. In contrast, if both parties have a weak BATNA, 
they will not find major obstacles to reach an agreement. As can be noted, a BATNA can be an 
accurate representation of how the power is distributed between two or more actors in a 
negotiation.  
SECTION II 
Background of the conflict  
The conflict in Colombia started in the 1960’s, and is known as the longest ongoing 
armed conflict in Latin America. According to the National Administrative Department of 
Statistics (DANE), more than eight million people are considered direct victims of the war. More 
than seven million people have been internally displaced, and more than nine hundred thousand 
have been killed. Around one hundred and sixty thousand people are reported as disappeared, 
thirty-four thousand people have been kidnapped and almost eighteen thousand have been 
victims of sexual violence (Registro Único de Víctimas 2017).  
The belligerent parties are the Colombian government (Army, Navy, Air Force, National 
Police), left wing guerillas (FARC, ELN, EPL, M19 and others), and right wing paramilitary 
groups (AUC, AAA, CONVIVIR, ACCU, Black Eagles and others) (Gillin 2015). FARC had 
always been the strongest guerilla group, since it was the largest in size, most militant, best-
trained and best-armed. Therefore, the administration in office had always attempted to achieve 
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peace with this guerilla group (Kline 2007, 10). For practical reasons, this article will only 
explain the origins and conflict between FARC and the Colombian government.  
The Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia are known as FARC because of its name 
in Spanish (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia). FARC emerged as a band of 
peasants who fled to the mountains to escape the violent period known as La Violencia4. The 
band started as a militia with no clear ideology that rarely clashed with the army. Gradually the 
group became part of an array of forces that helped the liberals in their clashes against 
conservatives.  
In 1958, after La Violencia, the two major parties –Liberal and Conservative– signed an 
Agreement called National Front (Frente Nacional), where both decided to present only one 
candidate per election, virtually leaving many groups out of the electoral scenario. In other 
words, both parties agreed to rotate power for each presidential term. The liberals and 
conservatives would alternate electing each other's candidates every election cycle (4 years). 
Moreover, the coalition distributed parliament seats and state bureaucracy equally with the 
objective of ending the rivalry between liberal and conservatives and preventing any third party 
from taking power (Palacios 2012, 42). After the creation of the National Front, the liberals no 
longer required the assistance of FARC and other forces. While other irregular militias put down 
their arms, FARC continued fighting and started defining themselves as a communist guerrilla. 
Thus, it could be said that the Liberal party had a leading role in the creation of FARC. 
                                                          
4La violencia: Period between 1949 to 1959 where guerrillas, bands and armed groups of the Liberal and 
Conservative Party of Colombia constantly fought leaving an estimate of two hundred thousand casualties. La 
violencia erupted after the death of the Liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. The populist 
dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1958) demobilized armed groups from 1953 to 1954, however, they 
reemerged shortly (Palacios 2012, 42). 
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The National Front was also a cause of frustration to many left-wing militants and 
peasants. Therefore, many moved their loyalties from the Liberal Party to the Communist party 
(PCC). The lack of incentives to participate in elections caused the formation of a peasant-based 
guerrilla branch with the objective of creating a revolutionary path for Colombia: FARC 
(Palacios 2012, 95-98). This explains how during the early and mid-sixties, the farmer band was 
transformed into a pro-soviet Marxist-Leninist, peasant oriented revolutionary guerrilla group. 
During the first decade, FARC were strongly linked to the PCC. In fact, there were many PCC 
members that were also part of FARC. However, following 1980, the Communist Party enforced 
a strict policy of expelling all the members that had parallel activities with FARC.  
FARC define themselves as the “people’s army”. According to their statute, they are a 
military and political movement that developed their political, propagandistic, organizational, 
and armed action based on a struggle of the masses to achieve power for the people (Palacios 
2012, 123). For almost two decades, FARC slowly expanded through the countryside of 
Colombia while being “just one of an alphabet soup of Colombian rebel groups” but in 1982 they 
started taxing drug producers and smugglers in the areas controlled by them (Otis 2014, 3). Their 
links to drug trafficking helped FARC raise more money for recruiting purposes.  Since they 
started being a safe haven for smuggling, their membership significantly increased. For instance, 
from 1986 to 1996 they went from having 3600 to 7000 men (Rángel Suárez 2005, 74). 
 FARC’s success in terms of recruiting did not mean they were unchallenged. After the 
breakup of the Cali and Medellin cartels, drug production in FARC-controlled territory 
increased. Nevertheless, right-wing paramilitary guerillas emerged and allied with some 
landowners and drug producers against FARC. The most prominent one is known as United  
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia or AUC) led by the 
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Castaño brothers.  The AUC were created in 1997 with the objective of combating kidnappings 
and extortion from FARC and ELN. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has suggested that AUC had close and direct ties to some members of the military forces and 
certain political elites (BBC 2013).  
Ultimately, FARC created a sub-state within a state, they settled in the Southern 
provinces of Colombia and hold until today control of some municipalities in the country. As 
stated by Kline, “FARC strongholds have tended to be frontier regions neglected by the national 
government and plagued by general lawlessness” (Kline 2007, 10). Moreover, FARC sustained 
their operations through drug trafficking, and infuse terror through kidnappings and extortion. In 
this context, FARC is certainly a sub-state actor that has territory, and even legitimacy in some 
of the areas in Colombia. 
SECTION III 
Previous Peace Processes: A brief review 
No peace process can be understood in isolation of its background. Andrés Pastrana was 
not the first president to engage in negotiations with FARC, to analyze what happened during 
Pastrana’s Administration, it is necessary to bear in mind what happened to the preceding peace 
processes. The most prominent previous attempts were led by President Belisario Betancur 
(1982-1986) and President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994).  
The first one took place in the early 80’s during Belisario Betancur’s administration. 
Betancur proposed a political rather than a military response towards FARC and other guerrillas. 
In fact, one of Betancur’s campaign promises was to pursue peace talks with FARC, ELN and 
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the M-19 movement. When elected, he promoted an amnesty law to encourage demobilization. 
Nevertheless, amnesty did not require disarmament. Soon, Betancur started the process with 
FARC in 1982 by creating a peace commission. The commission signed the Uribe Accords, “a 
bilateral ceasefire, with a small demilitarized zone established in the municipality of La Uribe in 
the Meta department, long a FARC stronghold” (Beittel 2015, 14). The ceasefire was valid from 
1984 to 1987, but disarmament was not achieved. 
Furthermore, in 1985 FARC formed the political party Unión Patriótica (UP) with the 
purpose of having a political wing to run for elections and compete with the mainstream parties 
in Colombia. Nevertheless, FARC kept its arms as a guarantee. In the general elections of 1986, 
UP won seats in Congress and Senate. In the 1988 local elections, UP won some mayorships and 
hundreds of seats in city councils (Beittel 2015, 14). The party ran under a platform of agrarian 
reform, nationalization of natural resources, and an economy anti-global capitalism.  
Betancur’s accomplishments were worthless after 2 presidential candidates, 21 
congressmen, 70 councilmen, 11 mayors and 3500 militants approximately were assassinated by 
paramilitary groups, drug dealers and national police during the next administration led by 
Virgilio Barco (1986-1990). Of course, after these events, FARC and other groups decided to 
return to belligerent activities (Alzate and González 2016). After these failed peace processes, 
FARC had clearly strengthened its position. In fact, “By the 1990s, FARC had shown 
considerable growth since the 1970s, with 49 Fronts operating throughout the country and the 
ELN with 34. In the course of the decade FARC established its presence in an estimated 57% of 
all Colombian municipalities” (Randall 2016, 3). 
The next attempt to achieve peace took place in Mexico and Venezuela during Cesar 
Gaviria’s administration. Gaviria gathered FARC, EPL and ELN in the same negotiating table. 
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Gaviria promised social reintegration and looked to achieve a ceasefire and a cease of attacks to 
civilians and the military (Randall 2016, 2). Anyway, the peace process failed after just over a 
year of negotiations because EPL kidnapped a former minister.  
The next president of Colombia was Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) who did not engage in 
any formal negotiations with FARC. His administration was characterized by the expansion of 
paramilitary groups, the continuation of FARC kidnappings and killings, and displacement of 
people in the rural areas (Randall 2016, 3). Furthermore, Samper had a controversial presidency 
given that he was accused of receiving money from the Cali Cartel for his presidential campaign.  
SECTION IV 
Negotiation under Pastrana’s Administration: Applying BATNA’s 
The next presidential elections were held in May 31st, 1998. The liberal candidate, 
Horacio Serpa, got 34,4% of the votes, conservative candidate Andrés Pastrana (Gran Alianza 
por el Cambio/Great Alliance for Change Party) got 34% and Noemí Sanín (Sí Colombia/Yes 
Colombia Party) got 26,4%5. Following the electoral rules in Colombia, Serpa and Pastrana had 
to go to a run-off. Serpa had gotten 33,729 votes over Pastrana and the political environment was 
extremely polarized, so both candidates had to focus on how to win the second round (El Tiempo 
1998).  
The idea of peace emerged in the conservative party the day after the first round of 
elections. Former conservative Mining Minister, Alvaro Leyva Durán, encouraged Pastrana to 
include a strong peace platform on his campaign and handed him a document that had previously 
been created by liberals, conservatives, the UN and FARC leaders. In mid-June, Pastrana 
                                                          
5There were other 10 candidates but neither got more than 2% of the popular vote.  
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appointed Victor G. Ricardo, a member of his campaign, to meet with FARC leaders. In the 
meeting, Ricardo and FARC members agreed that if Pastrana won the election they would begin 
a peace process where the government would grant FARC a demilitarized zone comprising five 
municipalities of Colombia (Valencia 2002, 34-35). 
In 1998, conservative candidate Andrés Pastrana won the presidential elections with 
51.9% of the popular vote against Serpa in a very close race. Some analysts suggest that one of 
the most important aspects that marked his victory was the meeting between Victor G. Ricardo 
and FARC leaders that took place prior to the election (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 35). In 
this sense, Pastrana came into office with the explicit intentions to end the conflict with FARC 
and a clear commitment with the Colombian people. However, before 1998, Pastrana was not 
characterized by being an activist for peace. He had not worked in any of the peace commissions 
of the previous governments or written anything favoring peace. He had not campaigned for a 
peace process in his 1994 presidential elections against Ernesto Samper. However, in what was 
perhaps a coincidence, Pastrana ended up as the most important advocate for a peace process in 
his campaign against liberals (Valencia 2002, 35-36). Perhaps this explains in part why FARC 
was a stronger bargainer than the Colombian government. Pastrana had no real experience with 
peace processes and this made FARC a more powerful actor.  
Once Pastrana was elected, he took the first step and appointed Victor G. Ricardo as High 
Commissioner for Peace. The president also established a demilitarized zone (zona de despeje) in 
October 1998. The zone was located between the departments of Meta and Caquetá, it had 42138 
square kilometers (approximately the size of Switzerland) and around 90,000 inhabitants. The 
demilitarized zone was initially supposed to last for 90 days, but it ended up lasting 3 years and 
being one of FARC’s most important bargaining tools (Kline 2007, 50). Following the creation 
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of the demilitarized zone, opposition to the peace process emerged from the Liberal Party and 
factions of the military.  
In fact, the first impasse happened when the government kept the Cazadores Battalion 
composed by 130 unarmed soldiers within the demilitarized zone. FARC demanded Pastrana that 
this troops be withdrawn. In mid-December 1998, after disagreements between some generals 
and the president, Pastrana ordered the Battalion to leave the area (El Tiempo 1998).  
By the end of 1998 two FARC positions were known. The first was that a cease-fire was 
something to be negotiated later, rather than earlier, in the process. That was in direct 
conflict with the position of the government and was to cause difficulties later, as we will 
see. The second had to do with the ten points (the FARC Decalogue) that the insurgent 
group wanted to negotiate (Kline 2007, 56).  
As shown above, the first obstacle to the peace process occurred before the peace process 
started. FARC proved that they were a strong actor since Pastrana’s first months in office and 
this tendency would remain for the next four years.  
FARC and the government started officially negotiating on January 7th, 1999, Manuel 
Marulanda did not show up to the inauguration ceremony, originating discomfort and speculation 
apropos of the peace process. he showed up the next day alleging that there was an assassination 
attempt against him from paramilitary groups. The firsts week of negotiations went by while 
both parties debated about procedural matters and the agenda to be set for discussion. Both 
FARC and the Pastrana government proposed different ten point agendas to be considered. It is 
noteworthy that while the government proposed a ceasefire, FARC negotiators stated that the 
ceasefire will only come when at least 90% of the issues were solved (Kline 2007, 60). 
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Furthermore, FARC held a firm position regarding the exchange of prisoners, they wanted 
Congress to pass a law guaranteeing permanent exchange of prisoners during the peace process. 
Marulanda announced that otherwise, they would start kidnapping politicians6 (Téllez, Montes 
and Lesmes 2002, 106). During the first weeks, FARC also talked about the need of civil society 
involvement in the talks. They emphasized that students, workers, indigenous and afro-
Colombian groups have a say in the peace process.  
The first period of negotiations was marked by the absence of Marulanda on the first day 
of talks and the firm bargaining position that FARC held. As stated by Randall, this sent a clear 
message to the government “FARC would negotiate from a position of strength” (2016, 3). For 
instance, the issue of ceasefire, although a priority for the government, was ruled out by FARC 
from the start.  
At this point, it is important to analyze the BATNA’s of the government and FARC. As 
stated by Fisher and Ury, “the reason you negotiate is to produce something better than the 
results you can obtain without negotiating” (Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating 
Agreement without giving in 1983). In this sense, negotiation is supposed to be the way out of a 
conflict, however, if negotiation does not work, the actors will potentially opt out and recur to 
their BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). A BATNA can either mean to keep 
the status quo, or to find another solution, less optimal than the negotiation outcome. 
Considering the historical background of the conflict, it is evident that the BATNA of 
FARC is always to keep the conflict going and to refuse to open to negotiations with the 
government in the near future. They also tend to continue guerrilla activities, kidnappings and 
trying to seize more territory. As a response, the BATNA of the government has also historically 
                                                          
6 FARC did not recognize the term “kidnappings”, but political retentions.  
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been to return to the status quo, which would imply increasing military presence in the region 
and escalating the conflict once again. One could argue that the BATNA of both actors was the 
same, since they both had to remain in conflict. However, there was a power imbalance between 
both actors. The government had a weaker BATNA because it made the search for peace the 
most important task of the administration. In fact, 1300 days of the 1460 were dedicated in some 
way to handle the peace process (Valencia 2002, 37). On the other hand, FARC was at the peak 
of its military power, having gained a lot from drug trafficking and recruitment. In this sense, it 
could be argued that there was a power asymmetry in the BATNA’s of both actors, even though 
they both had the same alternative if no agreement was reached.  
The first freezing of the talks took place on January 19, 1999. FARC announced the 
temporary suspension of negotiations after the violent acts carried out by coordination between 
paramilitary and military groups, where around 130 Colombians were killed (Kline 2007, 62). 
By these means, FARC requested the government to take actions against paramilitary groups. 
The government attempted to unfreeze the negotiations with a meeting, but they were 
unsuccessful. Moreover, on February 5th they unilaterally extended the demilitarized zone 
without any concessions from FARC. Three months went by and FARC had not unfrozen the 
talks yet (Kline 2007, 67). 
In March, the peace process faced another scandal. FARC abducted and then murdered 
three American indigenous rights leaders, Ingrid Washinawatok, Lahe'ena'e Gay and Terence 
Freitas. The three activists had traveled to Arauca, Colombia invited by the U’wa people to help 
them reform the educational system.  All of them were kidnapped by FARC on February 25 
while driving to the airport and were found a couple of days later “blindfolded, and riddled with 
bullets” (Environmental Research Foundation 1999). The first two obstacles to the process 
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showed that FARC was willing to carry its principle of negotiating amidst war. There were no 
intentions of ceasefire, and most importantly, FARC was established as the strongest actor in the 
table. FARC had proven that they had a “walk away point”, that they would remain negotiating 
only if the government fulfilled its demands.  
On April 18th, the government threatened to end the zone if negotiations did not restart. 
FARC agreed to resume talks two days later. After a few days of negotiating, both parties 
decided that they would form three commissions to carry on the process. One would solve 
procedural matters and manage civil society involvement, another one would discuss the issues 
in the agenda, and the third one would focus on substitution for illicit crops (Ramírez 1999). 
Furthermore, FARC and the government made progress regarding the creation of a common 
agenda to negotiate.  
In early May Pastrana traveled to Caquetá where him and Marulanda met and subscribed 
an agreement in which FARC committed to accept international overseeing for the process. Only 
when this agreement was signed, the unfreezing of the dialogues was made public. This decision 
was not well received by the military elites (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 149). May 6th 
marked the day when FARC and the government finally reached a common agenda for topics to 
be discussed, including: human rights, agrarian reform, the conservation of natural resources, the 
justice system, corruption, drug production and trafficking, military reform, taxing, and others. 
This was clearly a triumph for the government. They established a strong bargaining position, 
demanding FARC commitment and got to some consensus on the agenda to be used. However, 
the power was not reversed. 
The next crisis in the process did not occur between FARC and the government but 
within the government, when Minister of Defense, Rodrigo Lloreda, resigned. On May 21st, the 
22 
 
High Commissioner for Peace, Victor G. Ricardo, was interviewed by Diario El Espectador, 
where he expressed that the demilitarized zone might be extended indefinitely. As stated above, 
this was a very controversial issue for the military elites. As a consequence, Lloreda called for a 
press conference and publicly announced his resignation on May 26th, while President Pastrana 
was hosting an Andean Community summit. Lloreda cited disagreements with the president 
regarding the peace process, and specifically, the extension of the demilitarized zone as the main 
reasons for his resignation. According to some analysts, after he resigned, “the worst military 
crisis in the modern history of Colombia’s military began” (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 
159). In this way, Lloreda became a symbol of military opposition to the peace process. After 
this situation, Victor G. Ricardo announced the extension of the demilitarized zone for six 
months (Kline 2007, 75).  
The resignation of Lloreda and the military crisis proved that the BATNA of the 
government was weak, and that members of the administration were aware of it. Furthermore, 
the fragmentation within the government depicted a weaker position in the negotiating table. As 
the military was going through an internal crisis, the BATNA of the government was weakened, 
going back to conflict was more risky and costly for the government than for FARC. As stated 
by Spangler, “Having a good BATNA increases your negotiating power. If you know you have a 
good alternative, you do not need to concede as much, because you don't care as much if you get 
a deal” (Spangler 2012). Accordingly, at this point of the peace process FARC didn’t seem to be 
as committed. This was shown especially by the kidnapping of the American activists and the 
first freezing. In any case, the agreements reached in Caquetania did represent a first step 
towards peace, even though the agreements were mostly procedural.  
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The second freezing happened from July 18th to October 24th 1999. Paradoxically, the 
reason was the lack of consensus on the agreement they had already signed regarding the 
verifying commission. FARC cited lack of clarity about the installment of the commission and 
thus, refused to resume talks for a long time (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 193). It is 
noteworthy that the verifying commission was supposed to investigate crimes committed by 
FARC around and within the demilitarized zone, including “the use of unconventional weapons 
against civilians” (Kline 2007, 75). In spite of the government’s attempts to resume talks, FARC 
did not collaborate. For example, when Pastrana proposed a humanitarian agreement for the 
demilitarized zone, FARC replied that the country is still at war, and as such, FARC could not 
follow humanitarian law and would continue the kidnapping (El Tiempo 1999). In any case, 
FARC blamed the government for this freezing. Meanwhile, opposition increased from different 
factions of the elites, including the Congress, the Liberal Party and some members of Congress. 
 The second freezing was solved when FARC and the government agreed that even 
though there would not be a verifying commission, FARC would consider the option of 
ceasefire. In this way, one of the concessions made on the first agreement was broken. In 
addition, FARC would recognize the authority of mayors in the demilitarized area. Negotiations 
were resumed while there were still tensions between the government and the military elites. 
Despite the fact that the new Minister of Defense, Luis Ramírez, tried to ease tensions with the 
High Commissioner for Peace, the military elites had gathered proof of the irregularities that 
were happening within the demilitarized zone. After a couple of days, President Pastrana 
announced changes in the military leaders, assigning some of the generals that criticized the 
peace process to new positions abroad (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 198-202).  
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Once again, FARC was still positioned as the strongest bargainer at the table, through 
breaking the Caquetania agreement. The government’s internal structure was still fragmented, 
and that weakened the government’s position. It is noteworthy BATNAs are also defined in 
terms of perceptions. “If a disputant thinks that he or she has a better option, she will, very often, 
pursue that option, even if it is not as good as she thinks it is” (Spangler 2012). The second 
freezing gave FARC the perception that the government was willing to let go some agreements 
to keep the peace process in place. Perhaps this can explain what happened later.  
 The negotiations resumed on October 24th, 1999. Soon, both parties started discussing the 
involvement of the civil society in the peace process through the creation of a National Thematic 
Committee. FARC and the government agreed that the committee would compile 
recommendations made by actors in the civil society on how the process should be carried, but it 
would not have an authority over the decisions taken. Accordingly, the committee’s role was to 
host public hearings from certain groups and transmit them to the negotiating table. Towards the 
end of 1999, FARC and the government prepared a document the progress made since the talks 
started, listing the development of peaceful dialogue, the creation of a common agenda, the 
constitution of the National Thematic Committee, and the agreement on how the negotiations 
would be carried in the future (Kline 2007, 79).  
 On December 21st, 1999, FARC announced a short ceasefire that would last until January 
15th, 2000. This announcement represented one of the few accomplishments that the government 
had made since the beginning of negotiations and it showed FARC’s willingness to continue 
with the process. On the same day, FARC leaders handed in letters made by war prisoners 
(soldiers, policemen) to their mothers. Only a few days earlier these mothers had met with FARC 
leaders and they mentioned the importance of pressuring the government on a prisoner exchange 
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agreement (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 203-207). The ceasefire represented one of the 
peaks of negotiation, especially for the government since they attained what they were expecting 
for a long time. In this sense, the bargaining power of both parties was similar, no party had a 
clear advantage over the other. However, this does not mean that the power structure and 
BATNA of the parties changed.  
 By that time, the government of Pastrana had developed Plan Colombia with the 
sponsorship of the United States. The fact that FARC had kidnapped and murdered the three 
American activists not only destroyed all U.S. contact with the guerillas but also eroded U.S. 
support for the peace process in general. This was influenced by the fact that Republicans in 
Congress accused the Clinton administration for “blurring the longstanding U.S. policy of not 
dealing with terrorists” and drug-traffickers (Gilman 1999). As time went by, the Clinton 
administration was bound to devote more attention to drug issues in Colombia. In fact, 
Republican leaders argued that Colombia had turned into a narco-state that threatened the U.S. 
security. While Republicans in Congress pushed for a drug-trafficking dominated agenda, the 
State Department advocated for a multifaceted approach that would include “alternative 
development, justice reform, human rights protection, and economic recovery” (Albright 1999). 
The issue became a topic of heated discussion in U.S. Congress. At the same time, Pastrana’s 
administration was seeking economic support from the U.S. to fund his plan called Cambio para 
construir la paz, which aimed to strengthen the economy and the democratic system.  
As a result, the U.S government sent Secretary of State Thomas Pickering and a 
delegation to Bogota. Their role was to analyze the threats to democratic governance in the 
country. The final result was Plan Colombia (Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening 
of the State), a document –including an assistance package– drafted in the United States that 
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covered the areas of economic recovery, counter-narcotics, justice sector reform, 
democratization and social development, and the peace process (Arnson 2000, 16). Plan 
Colombia is now widely regarded as a unilateral, military, counter-drugs effort that disregarded 
the social and economic motives behind the appearance of guerillas. All European countries but 
Norway and Spain refused to support the plan because of its military focus, while FARC 
accepted the social aspects of the plan, but rejected its military clauses.  
As stated above, this plan started being implemented in 2000, while the negotiations were 
taking place. According to Kline, Plan Colombia provided more troops, weapons, and training 
than ever before. In this sense, “the Colombian military was going through one of its most 
profound changes in history” (Kline 2007, 174). The fact that the military was strengthening its 
capabilities strengthened the position of the government at the bargaining table, but it also 
eroded FARC’s commitment to the peace process, as we will see later.  
The talks resumed on January 20, 2000 with the presence of Manuel Marulanda. Both 
parties gathered to start discussing about substantial matters, however, they could not agree over 
what topic should be the first one to discuss between human rights and social issues. Only two 
days later, another scandal took place. A famous journalist known as La Chiva Cortés (Guillermo 
Cortés) was kidnapped by FARC. Cortés had a lot of credibility in the Colombian media, 
therefore, his kidnapping received a lot of coverage. In the middle of this crisis, FARC and 
government negotiators reached a three-block agenda: economic and social, human rights, and 
international policy, that would be addressed in that order. Another ceasefire would be discussed 
only after all these issues were tackled (Kline 2007, 80). 
A few days later, FARC and government negotiators were invited to Norway and Sweden 
to attend a series of conferences and meetings with international authorities. The tour was 
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arranged by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Colombia, Jan Egeland, 
and it soon extended to France, Norway, Italy, Spain, and the Vatican. This trip allowed both 
sides of the conflict to build confidence and to realize the amount of international support that 
the peace process had (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 215-227). At this point, it seemed like 
the peace process was going to move forward even though the parties were not negotiating 
during the tour. The power structure had not necessarily changed, but for example, FARC 
recognized the importance of humanitarian law after talks with the heads of the Red Cross.  
Some controversies surrounded the peace process for the following months. First, FARC 
formed a political party created by FARC called Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva 
Colombia. Second, they established a tax for people that had more than 1 million dollars to 
prevent them and their families from being kidnapped. This tax was called “Law 002” or tax for 
peace. Moreover, on the government’s side, the High Commissioner for Peace Victor G. Ricardo 
resigned in March citing that the peace process was not being successful enough. It has also been 
said that he received death threats by paramilitary groups. Pastrana accepted Ricardo’s 
resignation in May, and appointed Camilo Gómez to take Ricardo’s position. Gómez was 
Pastrana’s private secretary and he had also been part of the negotiating team. (Téllez, Montes 
and Lesmes 2002, 228-238). The lack of continuity of the team was also an obstacle for the talks 
to be successful. In fact, Pastrana named four different teams throughout the peace process, 
adding on more uncertainty to the conversations (Kline 2007, 52). It was difficult for FARC to 
deal with the changes, especially after Ricardo’s resignation. This might have led them to choose 
to pursue their BATNA instead of working harder for an agreement.  
The third freezing took place in May 16th, 2000, and it was the first and only one put 
forth by the government.  It happened when the government learned that FARC allegedly 
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launched a necklace bomb attack against the peasant, Elvira Cortes, and effectively killed her 
and two policemen that were trying to deactivate the bomb. The talks were frozen for less than a 
month, as it became clear that FARC was not responsible from La Chiva Cortes’ death. In June, 
the talks resumed when FARC and the government handed in ceasefire proposals to each other 
(Kline 2007, 84). It is important to highlight that FARC’s ceasefire proposal was very critical of 
Plan Colombia and requested the government to review it. As can be noted, Plan Colombia was a 
deal breaker for FARC to reach a substantial peace agreement. This means FARC preferred to 
remain at war (follow their BATNA) than to give up power in such a critical point.  
In the following months, public hearings continued being held, but the government was 
busy organizing Bill Clinton’s visit to Colombia in August, so there was no real progress in 
negotiations. During July and August, La Chiva Cortés and other kidnapped people were rescued 
by the military.  
The next obstacles emerged in early September, when FARC member Arnobio Ramos 
hijacked a plane that was heading to Florencia in the Caquetá department. Ramos forced the 
airplane to land in the demilitarized zone. According to FARC, this event was not centrally 
coordinated, but an individual action taken by Ramos. This event shows that FARC leaders did 
not have control over every action taken by their own guerrillas. However, they refused to turn 
him over to the government (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 260). The scenario deteriorated 
when FARC announced a strike in Putumayo, showing again that Plan Colombia represented a 
motivation for FARC to follow their BATNA in the middle of negotiations. Kline explains it as 
follows: “Demanding an end to the Plan Colombia’s military component, the guerrillas 
prohibited all vehicle traffic on the roads, resulting in isolated towns and hamlets suffering 
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severe shortages of food, gasoline, and drinking water. The strike lasted until early December, 
when the FARC unilaterally lifted it” (2007, 87).  
The negotiations froze once again on November 15th, 2000. FARC used the same argument as 
the first freezing, they stated that the government was not doing enough to control paramilitary 
groups. In spite of the freezing, the government decided to extend the demilitarized zone until 
the end of January 2001. During December, two impasses occurred. First, the Army chief 
Commander Jorge Mora announced that the armed forces had everything ready to retake the 
demilitarized zone when the president may require it. Furthermore, FARC assassinated Senator 
Diego Turbay, “while it seems clear that it was done by a FARC group, that is not to say that it 
had been approved by higher ups” (Kline 2007, 88). Once again, this shows that FARC leaders 
not necessarily controlled all the actions taking place amongst their combatants.  
These events affected the negotiations since they showed Colombian people and the 
government that FARC wasn’t willing to negotiate and they rather preferred to continue the 
violent fight against government officials and civilians. On the other hand, the government had 
invested too much effort in the talks, so they could not afford to walk out without an effective 
agreement. Achieving peace had become the most urgent task of Pastrana’s administration. In 
other words, the place of Andrés Pastrana in history would be determined by his peace efforts—
perhaps a noble sentiment but one that was to weaken his bargaining power, as shown below 
(Kline 2007, 52). In terms of BATNA, it meant that the government did not have a real best 
alternative, it had invested too much political capital into the peace process. On the other hand, 
FARC were already pursuing their BATNA when the government was acting aggressively with 
FARC -Plan Colombia- or not doing enough against paramilitary groups. For FARC, it was not 
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costly to reject the agreement because they did not pursue a ceasefire. In this way, the power 
dynamics between both parties were clearly unequal.  
 Certainly, the scenario before the end of the year was complicated. Nevertheless, 2001 
started with both parties showing willingness to continue working for peace. Dialogues were still 
frozen, and the president announced that the government would not renew the demilitarized zone 
if FARC did not accept to restart negotiations. In this context, Marulanda agreed to resume the 
talks and met with the President on February 8th, 2001. After the meeting, they signed the 
Agreement of Los Pozos which stated that negotiations would begin again and that a new 
commission would be created to formulate recommendations to the negotiating table. It was 
called Commission of Notables (Comisión de los Notables), since it would be composed of 
important personalities from Colombia. Additionally, the Agreement of Los Pozos created 
internal committees to address the causes of interruptions and to report what happened in the 
demilitarized zone, it also imposed a humanitarian agreement that would enable ill soldiers to be 
freed. Both parties also invited the international community and national organizations to 
information sessions about the peace process. Marulanda and Pastrana also held a press 
conference that day where they clarified the content of the agreement (Kline 2007, 92-93).  
 During the next three months, FARC and the government continued negotiating on the 
possibility of a ceasefire. The parties also explored ways to foster economic growth and tackle 
unemployment. Furthermore, they carried a meeting with foreign governments of the so-called 
friendly governments to the peace process7, and created an international commission to facilitate 
the peace process8 (Kline 2007, 94). Discussions about a humanitarian exchange were held at the 
                                                          
7 Germany, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Holland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Venezuela and the Vatican 
8Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela 
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negotiating table, however, both parties were hesitant to signed substantial agreements on this 
issue. Furthermore, the tasks of the Commission of Notables were clarified and its members of 
the were appointed9 (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 316).  
 Only in June could FARC and the government sign a humanitarian exchange agreement. 
This was clearly the first substantial agreement after more than two years of negotiations. Just a 
few days later, soldiers and policemen were liberated and sent to the cities, while the government 
also liberated FARC soldiers and transferred them to the demilitarized zone. Liberations 
continued throughout the month, but Jorge Briceño, one of FARC leaders, threatened to increase 
kidnappings. By the end of the month, high-profile kidnappings had risen, and the ceasefire 
agreement had not progressed (Kline 2007, 96-97).  
 The peak of the negotiations clearly had lost momentum by the end of the month. On 
July, in an interview with the daily journal El Espectador, FARC leader Raúl Reyes, mentioned 
that after the peace process a coalition government should be established and therefore, Pastrana 
should be removed from his position. Reyes mentioned: “What we want is to govern; the 
struggle of FARC is to be the government, to make a new state that guarantees the rights of 
people” (Castrillón and Gutiérrez 2001). Furthermore, the president and the peace commissioner 
fired the negotiating team stating that the government will take a more direct approach to the 
peace talks. Once again, a change in the team weakened the government’s position, while FARC 
still did not show enough commitment.  
July and August were marked by many discouraging events. In mid-July, FARC 
kidnapped Alan Jara, former governor of meta, and three German experts on drug crop 
eradication that were offering advisory in the Cauca department (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 
                                                          
9Carlos Lozano, Alberto Pinzón, Ana Mercedes Gómez, Vladimiro Naranjo 
32 
 
2002, 324-325). Later that month, FARC leaked its ceasefire proposal, forcing the government to 
do the same. Both proposals had barely any points in common, showing lack of consensus on 
this issue between both parties. For instance, FARC requested the government to end extradition 
for drug dealers and to end neoliberal policies. On the other hand, the government’s proposal 
stated that a condition for ceasefire would be that FARC release kidnapped persons, stop 
kidnappings and end extortion practices (Kline 2007, 98-99). On top of everything IRA (Irish 
Republican Army) troops were found in the demilitarized zone in mid-August. These events 
show the environment of the peace process was jeopardized after the humanitarian exchange 
signed in June. Events like these affected public opinion on the peace process. As stated by 
Villacreces, “Public opinion saw guerilla attacks and violence as a cynical behavior of FARC 
toward the negotiation talks”(2003, 16) 
 The Commission of Notables that had been formed through the Agreement of Los Pozos 
gained importance in the following months. The document released by the commission 
established an outline on how the negotiations shall proceed. The draft included 
recommendations like ceasefire and a bilateral truce until the end of negotiations. Furthermore, it 
suggested the creation of a Constitutional Assembly elected by popular vote to issue 
constitutional reforms. Afterwards, FARC would disarm and the military would adjust to the 
new conditions of the country. Regarding paramilitarism, the commission proposed the 
government to increase its anti-paramilitary operations and expel all the policemen and military 
members who had ties to these organizations. Likewise, the commission suggested that people 
with ties to paramilitarism be subject to ordinary justice (Kline 2007, 100-103). The 
recommendations made by this Commission were never effectively implemented. Additionally, 
when the file was being drafted, commissioner Ana Mercedes Gómez resigned citing 
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disagreements with other members. The Commission now had only one representative from the 
government, the other two were sympathetic to FARC. In this sense, the Commission of 
Notables also had an unequal power structure.  
The situation did not improve in September, in fact, two events jeopardized the peace 
process. First, Consuelo Araújo Noguera (former Minister of Culture) was killed one week after 
she had been kidnapped by FARC. FARC placed the blame on the Caribbean block of the army 
rejecting their responsibility in the event (Kline 2007, 105). Second, the liberal presidential 
candidate, Horacio Serpa organized a march to campaign in the demilitarized zone. He 
encountered FARC soldiers blocking him to go further: “Doctor Serpa, if you do not stop this 
march, we will have no other option but to detonate the car bombs we have ahead, and if you 
cross, we shoot. This is FARC territory and you cannot campaign here at our expenses” said one 
of FARC guerrillas (Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 333). 
Through these incidents, Pastrana realized that FARC had complete control over the 
demilitarized zone and even decided who could go in and who could not. As stated by Beittel, 
“the FARC demonstrated its lack of commitment to the peace process by using the demilitarized 
zone to regroup militarily, launch violent attacks, grow coca on a large scale, and hold hostages” 
(2015, 15). The guerrilla group were applying the BATNA even before reaching a negotiated 
agreement, they were negotiating amidst war in a territory that the government had practically 
granted them. However, it is clear that at this point the government knew that the stakes were too 
high to keep conceding without getting anything in return.  
In this context, the government had to prove that they were getting something in return of 
the demilitarized zone. In October, both parties signed the Acuerdo San Francisco de la Sombra. 
The most important achievement of the agreement was that FARC committed themselves to stop 
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carrying out kidnappings at national highways. The agreement also established that the 
recommendations submitted by the Commission of Notables would be examined, that citizens' 
participation would increase in the peace process, and that FARC would respect the power of 
authorities of the municipalities in the demilitarized zone (Kline 2007, 105-106). San Francisco 
de la Sombra was considered the most successful bargaining moment of the Pastrana 
administration. Although the commitment to stop kidnappings wasn’t honored by FARC. it is 
evident that at this precise moment of the negotiation, it was crucial for FARC to give up 
kidnappings so the government would stop receiving as much critics from the military and from 
public opinion.  
In early October, the president announced that controls around the demilitarized zone 
would increase. The military would have more presence in border areas and would fly over the 
zone constantly. Additionally, presence of foreigners around the zone would be more strictly 
controlled. Clearly, Marulanda and other FARC leaders were not satisfied with these decisions. 
Marulanda sent a letter to government negotiators stating that FARC negotiators would not 
return to the table if these measures were not lifted. Later, FARC sent out two additional letters 
expressing similar concerns. By the end of 2001, the peace process was in a critical situation, 
both parties were considering ending the talks and FARC even threatened to do so. FARC even 
rejected an offer made by the UN to act as a mediator in this situation (Kline 2007, 107-110).  
On January 9th, 2002, the government and FARC sat once again at the negotiating table. 
However, they could not agree on some of the most important points to carry on with the peace 
process: ceasefire and military controls of the demilitarized zone. Given that the parties could not 
agree on any substantial issues, Camilo Gómez, high commissioner for peace, announced that the 
peace process had ended and that FARC had 48 hours to leave the demilitarized zone. For the 
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first time the government seriously considered applying their BATNA instead of keeping up the 
pursuit of peace. The next day, FARC requested the UN to mediate the process and James 
LeMoyne, UN Special Advisor for the Peace Process met with the president and travelled to the 
demilitarized zone to meet with FARC. On January 13th, after LeMoyne’s mediation and the 
intervention of some ambassadors of the friendly nations, the peace process was back on track 
(Téllez, Montes and Lesmes 2002, 359-369). This shows that in the face of a threat, FARC put 
more effort into continuing with the peace process.  
January 20th marked the first day when FARC and the government agreed on a 
chronogram of activities for the peace process to continue. The highlights of the document 
released on this meeting include the beginning of discussion about a ceasefire and the cessation 
of kidnappings. Moreover, both parties agreed to invite presidential candidates to contribute to 
the peace process, to set up an international commission to mediate the process when difficulties 
take place, and to resume public hearings. For the first time, the parties set up a deadline to sign 
the ceasefire, that would have been April 7th, 2002. However, the agreements established on this 
document were not followed, and FARC issued a new agenda in February, very different from 
the common agenda that had been set by both parties, since it excluded the issue of a ceasefire. 
The government did the same thing in response, establishing the ceasefire as the priority (Kline 
2007, 114-118). By analyzing these events it is apparent that even after the threat placed by the 
government on January 9th, no changes were made by FARC. They still wanted to negotiate from 
a position of power, without making concessions or following the established agreements. The 
lack of implicit outcomes made the peace process unsustainable.  
On February 29th, the government unilaterally decided to end negotiations with FARC. 
The progress made since the last agreement was not enough to guarantee ceasefire, both parties 
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had still very different views on how to get there. Furthermore, members of FARC hijacked a 
plane and kidnapped Senator Jorge Grechem. Despite FARC leaders announced that they knew 
nothing about it, President Pastrana proceeded to end talks: “First, he asked the Juridical 
Secretary of the Presidency to prepare the resolution to end the demilitarized zone; secondly, he 
ended the political status of the FARC negotiators; and third he asked the national prosecutors 
office to reactivate the arrest warrants for the FARC leaders” (Kline 2007, 120). 
Pastrana announced that the peace process was over and that the military forces would 
take over the demilitarized zone starting at midnight. Three days later, FARC kidnapped former 
presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt as she was travelling to the demilitarized zone. 
Betancourt was kidnapped on February 23rd, only three months before the next 
presidential elections. In this way,   
that Pastrana focused on the peace process for almost four years, without getting enough 
in return from the guerilla group. In fact, “Pastrana’s government tried to keep the talks going at 
any price, even of fulfilling almost all guerilla demands without achieving some accord” 
(Villacreces 2003, 16). In this sense, the negotiation process was clearly asymmetrical in terms 
of power. The BATNA of both parties was to keep the status quo of being in constant war, 
however, it was more costly for the government in political and military terms. The demilitarized 
zone helped FARC get stronger and provided a safe haven for illicit activities. FARC could 
launch violent attacks, continue producing and trafficking drugs, and kidnapping Colombians 
without being held accountable for their actions in that area.  
After the events described above, public opinion in general turned against the possibility 
of negotiation. Beittel briefly describes the consequences of the failed peace process in the 
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following terms: “The failed negotiations severely disillusioned the Colombian public and 
generated widespread support for adopting a hardline approach to security embodied in the 
presidential campaign of Álvaro Uribe, who took office in August 2002” (2015, 15). The figure 
of Alvaro Uribe remains, until today, one of a man that strongly opposes talks with FARC and 
other guerilla groups.  
CONCLUSION 
Peace processes are certainly complex and heterogeneous, especially in cases like 
Colombia, where the conflict has been ongoing for decades, and there is a wide array of issues to 
tackle in order to achieve peace. Analyzing what happened during a peace process is no easy task 
either, one should carefully study what happened and examine different theories that may suit the 
case. Through analyzing the peace process led by Pastrana, one could argue that the concept of 
BATNA, proposed by Fisher and Ury, works as an effective theoretical framework to explain 
why the peace process between the Colombian government and FARC failed. As can be seen, 
BATNA’s are an accurate expression of the power configuration of a negotiating table. In this 
case, the BATNA’s of the actors depicted a scenario that favored FARC. This means, FARC was 
more likely to get what they wanted during the peace process.  
FARC not only had a better BATNA, but they had a walk away point and they used 
paramilitarism and Plan Colombia as strategies to freeze the negotiations without ending them. 
On the other hand, the government had only one strong bargaining tool, the demilitarized zone. 
The government rarely threatened FARC to end the demilitarized zone, and instead, it conceded 
extensions without demanding anything in return. In this regard, one can argue that in the case of 
Colombia and FARC, BATNA’s are important representations of how the power was unequally 
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distributed between actors in a negotiation. However, BATNA’s not only show the asymmetrical 
power distribution between the actors, they are also an important explicative variable of the 
failure of the peace process.  
As stated by Buelens and Van Poucke in an article concerning negotiation and 
psychology, the position of a negotiator is as powerful as its BATNA (Buelens and Van Poucke 
2004, 24). For this reason, the concept of Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement is an 
effective unidimensional variable to explain the complexity of why the peace process led by 
Pastrana failed. To put it in simple terms, Pastrana invested all his political capital in the ideal of 
peace, perhaps he expected to be remembered as the president who achieved peace, or perhaps 
he genuinely wanted to accomplish it. For these reasons, Pastrana’s government and the 
negotiating team did all that was possible to remain in conversations for almost four years. On 
the other hand, the message from FARC was clear, they “would negotiate from a position of 
strength”, and they would participate in peace talks in the midst of war (Randall 2016, 3). The 
power assymetries show that perhaps the moment was not ripe to achieve peace, as FARC had 
control of a significant portion of Colombian territory, while the government was going through 
internal struggles about the peace process.  
BATNA’s are important, however, the article suggests that the complexity of the peace 
process required to look for more explanations. In this sense, Section IV presents important 
insights about other key variables that could complement the explanation proposed by Fisher and 
Ury. For example, the lack of continuity in the negotiating table also created instability, and lack 
of centralized command in FARC eroded the peace process. Moreover, public opinion played an 
important role in leading the government to end the peace process, especially towards the end.  
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In brief, the analysis presented in this article shows that BATNA’s should start being 
used not only as a practical concept for negotiators, but also, as a theoretical framework for 
researchers. However, it will not be effective if used as an isolated explanation, and it has to be 
combined with elements from the context of each peace process. 
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